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(appellant here) respectfully petitions the

Court for rehearing.
The present decision of the Court has overlooked authorities
cited to the Court and misapprehends the ptate of current law. The
decision adheres to an old line of cases which, for the most part,
are factually inapposite and which were substantially modified by
later decision of this Court.

The decision misapprehends the

import of those modifying decisions.

The decision also overlooks

other statements in treatises cited by the Court, which statements
address the very problem presented by ^his case and suggest that
the utilization of the new technology addressed in this case
requires the need for further accommodation in the law rather than
reliance on concepts suitable to a bygone era.

The "waste water" cases which make up the principal part of
the reasoning in the present decision dealt for the most part with
water running from one piece of land to an adjoining piece of land
and involved the dispute of one farmer with another farmer. Those
cases speak of "recapture." No farmer is here "recapturing" water
at the end of his field.

Those cases for the most part dealt with

an immediate physical proximity and an immediate time frame.

We

deal here with water that does not simply run off or seep from the
end of one field to another but with water that over a vast area of
hundreds and hundreds of acres has seeped into the natural water
table that slopes from the cliffs on the west to Alvey Wash on the
east and becomes part of a natural water course which in turn is
part of the Escalante River System.

Though there is only one

plaintiff here, the decision affects the water of other farmers on
Alvey Wash and sets a dangerous precedent that will have adverse
consequences throughout this State.

We do in fact deal here with

water that has commingled with the natural water table every bit as
much and more as in Stubbs v. Ercanbrack, but the present decision
in referring to Stubbs v. Ercanbrack fails to acknowledge that.
Moreover, we deal here with decreed water rights on a natural
river system—water rights established for nearly a century—not
just a claim asserted by an adjoining land owner.

And these are

rights recognized in a general adjudication proceeding to which the
2

defendant made not the slightest protest £nd with respect to which
the pretrial order in this case and the defendant specifically
acknowledge the decree in that proceeding as decreeing rights to
this plaintiff.

(Exhibit 77).

It is respectfully submitted that th£ present decision of the
Court mispercieves the actual meaning of the McNauahton case and
treats it simply as a "waste water" case, whereas the proper
interpretation and application of that decision is as explained
beginning at page 8 of the Plaintiff's Rfeply Brief.
The present decision of the Court acknowledges that East Bench
Irrigation refused to adhere to the antiquated "waste water" cases
and held that those decisions did not apply where the upper users1
water returned to a natural system. The present decision restricts
the meaning of East Bench to where the "water returned to the
stream from which it was originally diverted."
that case, however, is not so restrictive.

The language of

The case speaks of a

"stream system," not merely the "stream" as this decision depicts
it.

"If such water after abandonment h^s re-entered a portion of

the stream system from which it was originally appropriated . . .
it becomes a part of that watercourse in legal contemplation as
well as physically . . . ."

(2 Utah 2d at 181, n. 6; 271 P.2d at

457, n. 6 (emphasis added) quoted at page 5 of the present
decision.) Even one of the treatises cited in the present decision
3

(the 1942 edition of Hutchins quoted at page 5 of the present
decision) states that

,f

If such water after abandonment has re-

entered a portion of the stream system from which it was originally
appropriated . . . it becomes a part of that watercourse in legal
contemplation as well as physically, and from the standpoint of
rights of use, it is just as much a part of the flow as is the
water with which it is mingled" and may be appropriated.
The distinction made in the present decision is artificial at
best.

It is not a distinction of substance and is not based on

principle, as discussed at pages 3-5 of Plaintiff's Reply Brief.
Decisions of such far reaching consequence as here involved should
not be based on artificial concepts but should deal with realities.
The fact that the water has for a century been returned to a
tributary of the Escalante rather than directly to the Escalante
should be of no consequence.

Other courts have so acknowledged.

In Mannix & Wilson v. Thresher, 26 P. 2d 373 (1933), the Montana
court long ago held that a lower user's right to return flows
transported from one stream to another in the same river system as
a result of an upper user's appropriation is entitled to protection
against

changes

in

the

upper

user's

manner

of

use.

The

artificiality of the distinction drawn in the present decision of
this Court is shown by the example at page 4 of Plaintiff's Reply
Brief.

A decision as far reaching as the one here made must rely
4

on hydrological realities and not artificial barriers.

The

difference in ten feet or ten thousand feet on the same river
system should make no difference.

The ten feet or the greater

distance on a tributary does not change the hydrological facts.
The enlightened decision of this C0urt in East Bench dealt
with fundamental principles.

The most fundamental concept of the

law of this State is that all waters in ^his State, whether above
or under the ground, are public waters.
the public.

They are the property of

Beneficial use is the basis, the measure, and the

limit of all rights to the use of water in this State. Even if one
has acquired a water right, what water is not beneficially used
belongs to the public.

The water right of the defendant New

Escalante Irrigation Company and its shareholders was and is so
circumscribed. The defendant Irrigation Company's water right was
not a totally consumptive right.

The right which it acquired to

use the water of this State was a right to take water from the
Escalante System and to return part of th&t water to the system for
the use of others on that system.
consumptive use.

Jt was a partially non-

This Court in East B^nch recognized this very

principle in noting that in that case, as here in this case, it was
clear "that a large percentage of such waters awarded to them [the
irrigation company] have not been consumed by such use". The Court
there recognized that
5

The lower users have acquired a vested right to use all
the unconsumed waters which would come down the stream to
them under the use made of the water by the upper users
and the conditions existing at the time they made their
appropriations. The upper users cannot by a change in
place of diversion or by a change in the place or nature
of use consume more water than would have been consumed
without the change and thereby deprive the lower users of
their right to use such waters without impairing the
rights of such lower users.
271 P. 2d at 454.
This concept

that

the

"consumption11

repeatedly emphasized by the Court.

may not be changed was

(271 p.2d at 456-459.)

Yet

the present decision permits the Irrigation Company to expand the
partially non-consumptive use it acquired by its appropriation to
a new and totally consumptive use.
The court in East Bench repeatedly referred to changes in the
"manner" or "nature" of the use as being prohibited if it impaired
the quantity of water reaching lower users.

The decision was not

restricted to a change in the type of use. It matters not that the
defendant here is still using the water for irrigation; it has,
nonetheless, changed the "manner" of so using the water.

East

Bench confirmed an expansive concept in the law of this State which
is a necessary concept to balance the use of the waters of this
arid State to the fair and beneficial use of all.

Indeed, we are

here committed by necessity to using waters "over and over again",
to use the words of East Bench, and lower and even subsequent
appropriators are and ought to be entitled to rely on the ability
6

to re-use water not previously placed to beneficial use when
investing

in their

sagebrush.

farms and wresting

the

land

from wasted

We have clearly here a change in the manner of use

which without question impairs the rights of lower users who have
relied on that water for decades.
Even if one were to still consider the water here involved as
"waste" water rather than water commingled with the natural water
table and water allowed to flow to a natural water course, the
cases have recognized that even with "waste water" a subsequent
user should be protected.

The trend away from the rigid concepts

applied in the present decision began to surface as early as 1921.
In United States v Hacra, 276 Fed. 41 at 46 (D. Idaho 1921), the
court explained that where for 18 years a water company and its
stockholders "had permitted the water to pass from their lands into
a natural channel physically tributary to the stream from which it
had been originally diverted, and to fwaste1 in a very real sense,"
and the defendant lower user had made beneficial use of a part of
that

water

continuously

"during

all

permitted

of

which

peniod

the

canal

company

the water to waste and manifested no

intention to recapture or again to use it," the case was such that
the canal company "must be held to have abandoned such right as it
may have had" and could not reclaim the water "to the detriment of
one who in good faith had appropriated it and was using it for
7

beneficial purposes."

That case, though certainly not binding on

this Court, is instructive to show a virtually identical situation
where the water was not totally consumed and was returned to a
tributary stream.

There, an enlightened view of the law would not

permit the lower user to be devastated.
The present decision acknowledges that it is undisputed that
the sprinkler system is twenty-five percent more efficient than the
prior flood irrigation system.

There was extensive and uncontra-

dicted expert testimony establishing this point.

No one disputes

that. Yet the decision appears to take off on the concept that the
Irrigation Company is not now irrigating more acreage than it did
prior to installation of the system.

That can not be so—the

twenty-five percent saved has gone someplace where it did not go
before.

No one can dispute that.

We need not get into a

calculation of the number of acres that the old appropriation
rights might conceivably have allowed the Irrigation Company to
irrigate. The point is that it obviously was not irrigating all of
those acres under its prior manner of using the water in flood
irrigating.

Contrary to the inference in the present decision, no

one has suggested that the new system "makes water," and it is not
a matter of the "crops consuming more water." There is no evidence
to that effect, and the suggestion is difficult to understand. The
same crops have been planted since installation of the sprinkler
8

system as before. The fact is that the tyenty-five percent of the
water that once joined the natural water table and returned to the
natural water course is now used to water acres not previously
watered.

It is irrelevant whether the water is being used to

irrigate the 2712 acres decreed.
previously being watered.

All pf those acres were not

The twenty-five percent is not going

down Alvey Wash; it is not being consumed by the plants.
being used to water acres not previously watered.
mind can question that.

It is

No reasonable

It makes no difference that the acres may

or may not be within "decreed" acres.

Water not previously

consumed by the defendant and which was beneficially used by the
Alvey Wash users is now consumed by the defendant.

That is the

point, and there can be absolutely no argument about that.
The failure to file the change application should not be so
easily disposed of as the present decisiqn seems to do. The Court
has misapprehended the legal point concerning the requirements of
proof.

If New Escalante had filed a chahge application as it was

required by the statute to do, it would have been required to
show—it would have been its burden to show—that its proposed
change would not impair the rights of otfier users.

It should not

be permitted to avoid that requirement by simply ignoring the law
by not filing the required change application.
have that burden here.

It should still

It is a fundamental concept embedded in
9

Utah law and in its statutes that a change can not be made if it
adversely affects others, and it is required that the party making
the change sustain the burden of so showing.

By written statement

of the State Engineer's office responsible for administering this
water, made in direct response to inquiry made by the defendant,
the State Engineer's office would have required "that the flow from
Alvey Wash must now be further supplemented from irrigation company
shares."

(See discussion at pages 21-22 of Plaintiff's Reply

Brief.)
Lest there be any misunderstanding, no one is here trying to
force the Irrigation Company defendant to continue to appropriate
and transport water from the Escalante River.

If it does not wish

to do so, it can abandon its appropriation and the water will
continue in the Escalante and the plaintiff and her fellow users on
Alvey Wash or any others would be entitled to appropriate that
water from the Escalante.

But if the water is to continue to be

used by the Irrigation Company under its prior appropriation, that
appropriation is circumscribed by the conditions of use and the
amount of water consumed as part of that appropriation over the
last century.

The present decision, in stating that "so long as

New Escalante diverts only that volume of water to which it is
entitled, it should be allowed to make the most efficient use of
it" (page 9), improperly looks to diversion and not to beneficial
10

use as the measure of New Escalante's right.

New Escalante's

right, as discussed above, was a right that allowed for use of
water by others, and although New Escalar^te and every other water
user in this State has the right to improve efficiency, it may not
do so to the extent that exercise of that right impairs the rights
of others.
The present decision of the Court quotes at page 6 from a
later edition of Beck et al. a treatise not cited in the briefs but
referred to in oral argument, but the decision overlooks an
important statement in the prior (1972) edition of that treatise
which was quoted at argument.

That statement points to the need

for articulation of the proper application of the law that is here
urged upon this Court. At page 80 of volume 5 of the 1972 edition
of that treatise reference is made to the problems presented by the
application of new technology.

By the sentence at page 80 which

reads, "The user may insist that because of new practices the duty
of water is changed and therefore the irrigator may claim that he
is entitled to expanded uses," the author^ infer that such expanded
uses ought not to be permitted.

In discussing the amount of water

beneficially consumed in irrigating practices, the authors (one of
whom was counsel for the defendant in tWis case) acknowledged in
that edition that "modern sprinkler-type irrigation" presents new

11

dimensions to old problems.
(1972), p. 80.)

(5 Beck et al. Water and Water Rights

It is there acknowledged that

The need for careful measurement and understandable rules
is clear if better water allocation and water-saving
practices which will not impair existing rights are to be
encouraged.
Conflicts in this area will probably
increase and raise additional questions related to the
duty of water, beneficial use, seasonal uses, and changes
in places of diversion and use. (Id. p. 81. Emphasis
added.)
There, citing an Arizona case, the authors state in a footnote that
that case "emphasizes that the saved supply reverts to the public
and is subject to appropriation" and that "in most areas the amount
saved is theoretically available to supply prior appropriators who
are receiving a short supply from an over-appropriated stream."
Thus, that treatise and those authors recognized that the water
saved by the use of new sprinkler technology should be utilized as
the plaintiff here requests and as the State Engineer would have
required had the defendant sought the permission for its change
that our statutes require.1
1

The new edition with different authors does not appear to
treat the impact of change in technology.
In quoting from a
different portion of the 1991 edition, the present decision does
not consider all of the language quoted. That language includes
the explanation that "the basic exception to allowing recapture is
where the portion that would be subject to recapture has become
return flow, that is finds its way back to its source. At that
point, if not before, it becomes tributary water and subject to the
call of the stream." We do indeed deal here with return flow. To
say otherwise requires the adoption of the artificial distinction
discussed above, and the law ought not to utilize a distinction
like that.
12

We do not here attempt "to compel Nefrr Escalante to allow the
water applied to irrigation to run off their shareholders1 lands1*
as the present decision seems to perceive (page 10)• That would
indeed be contrary to sensible water policy.

But we do request,

just as the treatise just referred to suggests, that the amount of
water saved by new technology should in part be utilized to supply
those users whose supply has been reduced by the new technology.
This case depends on fundamental principles, not on what one
treatise or another may say in attempting to reconcile conflicting
cases; nor does it depend on labels used in old cases.
today,

in

this

classifications

era,

should

not

of yesteryear.

opportunity for new thinking.

be

New

bound

by

technology

The Court

"pigeonhole1*
presents the

The most fundamental principles of

water law discussed at pages 5 and 6, above, must be applied to new
situations without being stuck to old trappings of "waste water,"
"recapture," etc.

Those trappings, which may be applicable on

other facts, have nothing to do with this case.

The fundamental

principles underlying all water law should be looked to here to
balance the rights of all. This case presents this Court with the
opportunity to advance the modern concepts of East Bench and free
itself from the confusing pigeonholes of the past.
This is not a case where there has to be one winner and one
loser.

This is not a case where hidebound concepts need cause a
13

win-lose situation either for the parties now before the Court or
the myriad of water users in this State.

The Court can here

fashion, and has been requested to fashion, a decree that will at
the same time encourage the use of new technology and yet protect
other users.

The evidence in this case is clear and undisputed

that New Escalante can replace the loss suffered by the Steeds and
all other users on Alvey Wash and still irrigate nearly twenty
percent more acreage than it had been able to irrigate before the
change to the pressurized sprinkler system.

Modern law ought to

accommodate modern technology and properly allocate the use of this
scarce resource to all concerned and not force a straight jacket
concept where other users of many decades are injured beyond
repair.
Respectfully submitted.
GARDINER & HINTZE

L. TT. \Gardiner, Jr.

U

Attorneys for Plaintiff/Appellant
DATED:

August 31, 1992.
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CERTIFICATE OF GOOD FftlTH
and
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
This Petition for Rehearing is presented in good faith and not
for delay.
The foregoing Petition for Rehearing was served upon the
defendant/respondent hereto by mailing a true and correct copy
thereof this 31st day of August, 1992, to the following:
Steven E. Clyde, Esq.
CLYDE, PRATT & SNOW
77 West Second S o u t h , Sijiite 200

Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Attorneys for Defendant/Respondent
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